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Introduction – 
corruption and accountability
CORRUPTION undermines water and sanitation services. 
It is those without voice, the poor, who are systematically 
deprived by corrupt systems. An estimated 20% to 70% of 
resources could be saved if transparency were optimised 
and corruption eliminated, thus freeing up most of the 
resources needed to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) for sustained water and sanitation services 
that reach the poor. [Shordt et al, 2006]
The pioneering work of Transparency International (TI), 
founded in 1993, has been instrumental in legitimising efforts 
to focus on transparency, corruption and honesty around the 
world. TI has stimulated international institutions – such as 
UNDP, the OECD, the World Bank - to develop policy and 
programmes, and is also one of the founding members of 
the Water Integrity Network – WIN (http://www.waterinteg-
ritynetwork.net/).  [Shordt et al, 2006]
A milestone, in this respect, is the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2004 [World Bank, 2003], which pro-
posed a new approach to address the failure of providing 
social services to poor people. This approach systematically 
considers the political and institutional dimensions that in-
fluence service planning, funding and delivery to the poor. 
Accountability relationships – especially between decision 
makers, service providers and the poor clients – are considered 
key to the success and failure of service provision. Tradition-
ally, the analysis of public service failures had focused on 
infrastructure, staff, financial resources and commodities. 
The World Bank’s “triangle of accountability” defined two 
routes linking the public in general with service providers. 
On the short route, providers must report to their clients 
(“client power”). On the long route, they are responsible to 
the government bureaucracy (“compact”) – the leaders of 
which, in turn, are made accountable in elections (“voice”). 
The World Development Report argued that strengthening 
accountability along these two routes would improve serv-
ice delivery to the poor. In their commentary on the report, 
Villar and Dodd (2005) add that donors should also be fully 
considered when accountability relationships are mapped 
out, transforming the World Bank’s conceptual “triangle” 
into a “rectangle”.
The decentralisation trend
Since the end of the International Water Supply and Sanita-
tion Decade (1981-1990), responsibility for water, sanita-
tion services, and to a lesser extent hygiene promotion has 
shifted from centralised systems coordinated by national 
level government bodies to local and intermediate levels 
of government. Various factors, including the failure of 
centralised systems to deliver services, in particular to the 
poor, international conventions recognising the importance 
of decision making at the local level of government, and 
the processes of decentralisation and structural adjustment, 
have contributed to this shift. [Fonseca and Moriarty, 2006, 
48].
In countries where decentralisation has taken place - and 
where most of the money comes from the national govern-
ment in combination with donor money in the form of basket 
funding - local governments are increasingly in charge of 
planning and deploying the money for construction and 
service provision. Examples are seen in South Africa, Co-
lombia and other Latin American countries. [Fonseca and 
Moriarty, 2006, 39].
This paper questions the assumed relation between the decentralisation and privatisation of the provision of WASH services 
on the one hand and increased transparency and accountability on the other.   Practices in India and Africa show that this 
is often not the case. Accountability and transparency are sometimes lost when the contractual arrangements between 
decentralised government and the private sector actors do not lead to involvement and informing  user communities and 
when  the role of local NGO’s is not recognised. As a result the quality of some work is poor, ownership of WASH services 
is low, and the equity principle is compromised.  Nevertheless, these same decentralisation and privatisation processes 
create opportunities to empower communities and develop measures to combat  private gain and increase transparency 
at the implementation level. In this paper some of these good practices are described.  Particularly the role of the civil 
society in the promotion of accountability and honesty is crucial. NGO’s could play an important role.
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Arguments for decentralisation 
The implementation of decentralisation is usually motivated 
by two arguments:
• decentralisation can lead to an increase in efficiency
• under the right conditions (democratic local elections, a 
strong legal framework and a real delegation of power 
to local governments), decentralisation can lead to im-
proved governance by enhancing accountability and the 
monitoring of government officials and decision makers. 
[Jütting et al., 2005].
Another argument for donors to support decentralisation is 
that it enables them to by-pass central government if this is 
perceived to be corrupt or abusing human rights. The World 
Bank is applying this new approach in Ethiopia where it 
will “provide $215 million of its new aid to hundreds of 
local governments, mainly for basic services such as water, 
health and education”. The effectivenss of this approach 
will depend on whether the “right conditions” as mentioned 
above by Jütting et al have been met.. [Blustein, 2006 ; 
World Bank, 2006].
Changing roles and sector reform
As a result of ongoing reforms, which include decentralisa-
tion, privatisation and increased community involvement as 
key components of change, the role of the actors in the WASH 
sector has been entirely redefined. Among these changes 
are a refocusing of the state on its policy, legislative and 
monitoring function and a des-engagement from operational 
functions. In most cases there is a transfer of operational 
responsibility to the local level, a greater involvement of 
water users, and involvement of the private sector. Improved 
donor coordination and basket funding mechanisms are other 
aspects of these reforms.
Where decentralisation has 
not automatically improved 
transparency: India and Uganda
Empirical findings in India, comparing decentralised with 
centralised water services providers, show that centralised 
agencies were significantly more efficient. In a study under 
6000 households and 200 water supply agencies Asthana 
found that more customers (51%) of decentralised systems 
paid bribes, especially to falsify bills, than those (41%) of 
centralised systems. There was also a notable difference 
when there were repairs involved. One of the major reasons 
for the higher levels of corruption given was the unhealthy 
relationship between staff members with politicians and 
local residents. Decentralised agencies are more subject 
to pressure and more accessible than centralised agencies. 
[Asthana, 2004 ; Davis, 2004].
WaterAid Uganda with support of Tearfund carried out a 
study on the impact of private sector participation in WASH 
service delivery to the poor in Uganda in 2003. While the 
researchers observe that the decentralisation and privatisa-
tion process did contribute to a greater coverage of service 
delivery in the water sector in Uganda, there is still  much 
to be desired where sustainability, quality, community own-
ership and accountable equitable access were concerned. 
Projects are more and more about contracts between local 
government and private contractors and the user community 
is typically not a party in those contracts. They could not 
get back to the contractor for substandard work.  Generally, 
community users could not even identify the contractor, they 
do not know what the contract is all about and site selection 
is often not done or only with a small group of people at 
the last minute. The potential users are often not involved 
in the choice of appropriate technologies and cannot make 
informed choices. [Barungi, 2003].
Own observations during my work in Western Uganda as 
advisor of NGO’s active in WASH, (BvO)  confirmed those 
findings of Barungi. Local NGO’s in Uganda had often closer 
contact with user communities and  were more  focused on 
their development and empowerment and therefore served 
in general better the communities than private contractors 
did.  But as a result of the privatization the NGOs  are more 
and more left out in the implementation of WASH projects. 
In Uganda NGO’s can register as private contractors and 
also apply for contracts. However the procedures involve 
generally seed money (sometimes 10% of the total bid) 
which they can’t afford to pay to the government officials or 
politicians in charge of the selection of contractors, unless 
they hide this in their books.
Both examples show that the reform process, if not properly 
supported by monitoring structures, might contribute to the 
lack of transparency and could lead to the misuse of funds for 
private gain. It could also contribute to poor quality, while 
the poor remain unserved. This hampers the sustainability of 
WASH services which in the end challenges the MDG’s.
Methods and tools to improve 
transparency
There are a range of good practices and tools developed, 
initiated or implemented by local NGOs which typically 
could be used for increased efficiency and transparency in 
the decentralisation process. While some of these tools and 
practices have been specially developed to prevent corrup-
tion, others were developed long before tackling corruption 
was on the development agenda and many of them are not 
unknown.
Community monitoring – Kerala, India
A range of tools to improve transparency was used in commu-
nity-managed sanitation programme in several local districts 
in Kerala, southern India. An NGO called Socio Economic 
Unit Foundation (SEUF) working in partnership with local 
governments, carried out a household sanitation programme 
aiming to serve half the families below the poverty line in 
the targeted area with good quality household latrines and 
related hygiene and sanitation promotion. (Kurup, 1996.)
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One of the first steps was to organise committees for each 
ward or village (300 to 600 households) whose members 
were representative of the different groups in their wards. 
It was found that if these multi-purpose water and sanita-
tion committees represented only the most powerful, or 
only one of several political parties, then the benefits of the 
programme would easily be diverted.  The way of forming 
committees followed agreed rules. All different groups in 
the neighbourhood were to be represented on a seven-person 
committee, including at least three women.  The NGO staff 
and local government made spot checks to verify that the 
rules for committee formation were followed.  In each ward 
they asked householders: What are the groups in this area 
(religious, political, service, caste groups and so on)? Who 
represents them on committee? Problems were referred to 
NGO and local government and in some cases committees 
had to be re-formed. Committee members were trained in 
programmes that involved making plans and practicing ac-
counting and inventory procedures.
Most of the tools used to ensure transparency, governance 
and prevent corruption are fairly well-known. It is interesting 
to note that the programme described in this case study was 
developed before 1995, long before preventing corruption 
had a place on the recognized international agenda.  What 
this may imply is that tools which enhance effectiveness 
also enhance transparency and prevent corruption.  This 
also implies that the tools are known and have been applied 
often by local NGO’s
Community mapping in Uganda
There are more examples of NGO’s who developed tools 
which are very useful to improve good governance and 
equitable access. One of those NGO’s is HEWASA (Health 
through Water and Sanitation), a local NGO in Western 
Uganda well known in the region for its sustainable and 
low-cost integrated water and environmental sanitation 
programmes. They developed over the years a series of tools 
and participatory methods which were also used in a pilot 
project instigated by the Directorate of Water in Uganda in 
collaboration with DFID.
As the earlier study by WaterAid  (Barungi, 2003) showed, 
well established NGOs in WASH are better equipped to 
prepare communities for WASH service provision than 
private companies. The  Software Pilot Programme (SPP) 
was aimed to improve the effectiveness of  WASH services 
by involving  local NGOs in preparing  and supporting the 
communities  to own and sustain their WASH facilities and 
services. A number of NGOs  were selected to provide all 
the social infrastructure in the pilot while the private sec-
tor provided the hardware and were supposed only to start 
when communities had agreed site selection, had an O&M 
system in place, had contributed in cash and in kind and their 
representatives had signed an MoU with the contractor about 
each other’s responsibilities and contributions. 
HEWASA was the NGO selected to carry out the pilot 
in Western Uganda.  An earlier project proposal served as 
the basis for the new pilot. The NGO started by providing 
detailed information about the project to the communities, 
conducting extensive transit walks and community mapping 
and soon it became clear that less accessible   communities 
living uphill were left out in the earlier planning of the projects 
and some of the sites were planned near an already serviced 
area where politically influential people were living. The 
NGO together with the communities were constantly alert 
and had to re-negotiate with the local government and later 
on with the contractor to include poorer and less accessible 
villagers, and to make sure they got the services they had 
paid for. The community maps and the MoUs between the 
different parties  proved to be important tools for the negotia-
tions and to have quality services on the ground.  [Oostrum, 
2006 ; Baguma, 2005].
The evaluation report of the pilot programme in Uganda 
confirmed some of  the above findings. Although not all the 
intended  objectives were met in the pilot, the District Water 
Officer of Kabarole stated that beneficiaries placing greater 
demand for accountability and services from services  pro-
viders was one of the unintended benefits.  HEWASA  itself 
felt  that residents have increased their ability to demand for 
services through their supporting programme. Concerning 
the various MOUs forming the basis for the operational 
institutional framework of the SPP, other  pilot Districts also 
confirmed the usefulness for  the communities to demand for 
what was agreed and making the government more answer-
able to the community. [Nycander, 2005].
Water point mapping – experiences from 
WaterAid
WaterAid has used water point mapping (WPM) in their 
country programmes to monitor the effectiveness of their 
investments in service delivery, verify water supply and 
sanitation coverage, evaluate access and equity in rural and 
urban contexts and for strategic planning and advocacy at 
local and national government levels. In 2005, the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) and WaterAid embarked on a 
project to evaluate the use of WPM in WaterAid’s country 
programmes in Ghana , Malawi , Nigeria , Nepal, Pakistan and 
Tanzania (see http://www.odi.org.uk/wpp/Projects.html).
Using Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies to 
produce digital maps, WPM provides a way to visualise 
technical, socio-economic and managerial information, 
making complex information more accessible. Under sev-
eral conditions, particularly the active participation of users 
and a system for updating are important, WPM can play a 
role in supporting decentralisation processes by helping to 
create downward accountabilities between district officials 
and water. [Welle, 2005].
Conclusions
Reforms in the WASH sector create opportunities for a more 
open and transparent service delivery, particularly they in-
volve community ownership and management of facilities 
and pro-poor policies. Informing and involving community 
OOSTROM and DIETVORST
563
members in community mapping, site selection and monitor-
ing has proven to improve efficiency and sustainability.
There is a need to create monitoring structures at the 
community level. Water users have to be involved in site 
and technology selection, they need to know about contracts 
and contractors, warranty periods, materials used etc. Local 
NGOs have developed tools and mechanisms to  support 
those users and community leaders in becoming informed 
and involved. The government of Uganda  has taken the lead 
by starting a learning  programme around NGO’s supportive 
role in effective WASH service delivery in the decentralisa-
tion process. Donors and other National Governments should 
also find ways to support and help institutionalise the sup-
porting role of NGOs.
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